


According to Reuters, Chinese independent refiners are preparing for a significant shift in their crude sourcing strategies as supplies of Venezuelan oil to Asia tighten. The catalyst is geopolitical rather than commercial: following the capture of Venezuelan President Nicolas Maduro and a subsequent agreement between Caracas and Washington, a substantial portion of Venezuelan crude is now earmarked for the United States. This development has profound implications for China, the world’s largest crude importer and a major buyer of discounted, sanctioned oil.
For years, Venezuelan oil has been a critical feedstock for China’s teapots, prized for its heavy quality and deep discounts. The sudden redirection of volumes to the U.S. market disrupts a fragile equilibrium that had allowed Chinese refiners to balance sanctions risk, refining economics, and domestic fuel demand. What follows is not merely a substitution of barrels, but a reconfiguration of China’s energy trade relationships.
The latest disruption underscores how Venezuelan oil has become hostage to geopolitical maneuvering. President Donald Trump stated that Venezuela would export up to $2 billion worth of crude to the United States, a move that effectively sidelines China as a key destination. According to Reuters, analysts expect this arrangement to curtail shipments to Asia, removing a vital source of cheap crude for Chinese independents.
Unlike market-driven supply shocks, this shift is politically engineered. For Chinese refiners, the loss of Venezuelan oil is not the result of rising prices or logistical constraints, but of diplomatic realignment. This distinction matters, because it limits the scope for negotiation or arbitrage. The barrels are simply no longer available.
To understand the impact, one must appreciate the role Venezuelan oil plays in China’s refining ecosystem. Independent refiners, concentrated in Shandong province, operate on thin margins and rely heavily on discounted heavy crude. Venezuelan grades such as Merey have been particularly attractive due to their compatibility with teapot configurations and their historically steep discounts to benchmarks like ICE Brent.
In 2025, China imported roughly 389,000 barrels per day of Venezuelan oil, accounting for about 4% of its seaborne crude imports, according to Kpler data cited by Reuters. While this share may appear modest, its importance is magnified by price sensitivity. Losing Venezuelan oil removes one of the cheapest options available to these refiners.
Despite the halt in new loadings, the immediate impact is cushioned by inventories. Reuters reports that at least a dozen sanctioned vessels loaded in December departed Venezuelan waters in early January, carrying around 12 million barrels of crude and fuel. Much of this Venezuelan oil is already en route to or stored near Asian destinations.
Kpler senior analyst Xu Muyu estimates that Venezuelan oil currently afloat in Asia could cover approximately 75 days of Chinese demand. This floating storage acts as a temporary buffer, allowing refiners time to assess alternatives rather than scrambling for replacement barrels. However, buffers are finite, and strategic decisions cannot be postponed indefinitely.
As supplies tighten, Iranian crude is widely expected to replace Venezuelan oil in teapot feedstock slates. According to Reuters, Iranian Heavy crude is currently offered at discounts of around $10 per barrel to ICE Brent, making it the cheapest and most readily available alternative. Importantly, supply from Iran is described as ample.
For Chinese refiners already accustomed to handling sanctioned barrels, switching from Venezuelan oil to Iranian crude does not fundamentally alter their risk profile. Logistics, payment mechanisms, and blending practices are well established. As a result, the transition is expected to be operationally smooth, even if not economically identical.
Russia is another beneficiary of the retreat of Venezuelan oil from China. Since Western sanctions intensified, Russia has become a cornerstone supplier of discounted crude to Asia. Analysts quoted by Reuters emphasize that ample Russian feedstocks remain available, reducing the likelihood that Chinese refiners will bid aggressively for unsanctioned barrels.
This abundance reinforces a broader trend: China’s growing dependence on a small group of sanctioned suppliers. While this strategy has delivered cost advantages, it also concentrates geopolitical risk. The Venezuelan oil episode serves as a reminder that such dependencies can shift abruptly.
One immediate market effect has been a narrowing of discounts for Venezuelan oil. Reuters notes that Merey crude for prompt delivery was recently offered at discounts of around $10 per barrel to ICE Brent, compared with roughly $15 the previous month. Another trader cited offers at minus $11 per barrel, though actual trade has largely stalled.
This compression reflects scarcity rather than strength. As fewer Venezuelan oil cargoes are offered, sellers have less incentive to provide deep discounts. For teapots, however, even a reduced discount may not justify the uncertainty surrounding future supply, reinforcing the case for diversification.
While sanctioned crude dominates the conversation, China retains access to unsanctioned sources. According to Reuters, potential alternatives include Canada, Brazil, Iraq, and Colombia. Middle Eastern grades such as Iraqi Basrah have also been mentioned by traders as possible substitutes for Venezuelan oil.
Canadian crudes, including Cold Lake and Access Western Blend shipped via the Trans Mountain pipeline, have recently seen wider discounts, reportedly $4 to $5 per barrel to ICE Brent for April delivery. These barrels could partially offset the loss of Venezuelan oil, though longer voyage times and blending requirements pose challenges.
Despite the headlines, Chinese independent refiners are not expected to panic. Sparta Commodities analyst June Goh told Reuters that while the “Venezuela drama” hits teapots hardest, ample Russian and Iranian supply means they are unlikely to bid up unsanctioned barrels. In her view, the economics simply would not make sense.
This measured response reflects experience. Teapots have navigated sanctions, policy shifts, and price volatility for years. The gradual phasing out of Venezuelan oil is disruptive, but not existential, provided alternative discounted supplies remain accessible.
The retreat of Venezuelan oil from China raises broader questions about energy security. Heavy reliance on sanctioned suppliers exposes China to political leverage and supply disruptions beyond its control. While diversification is possible, it often comes at a higher cost.
At the same time, China’s willingness to pivot quickly demonstrates resilience. By reallocating purchases among Iran, Russia, and other suppliers, China can maintain throughput and domestic fuel stability. The challenge lies in balancing short-term economics against long-term strategic autonomy.
The redirection of Venezuelan oil to the United States reshapes global trade flows. U.S. refiners gain access to heavy crude well suited to their configurations, while Asian markets adjust by absorbing more Iranian and Russian barrels. According to Reuters, such shifts illustrate the fluidity of oil markets under geopolitical pressure.
These changes also influence freight rates, storage economics, and benchmark pricing. As Venezuelan oil volumes decline in Asia, regional differentials may adjust, subtly altering the competitive landscape for other heavy crude suppliers.
Looking ahead, the future of Venezuelan oil in China remains uncertain. Much depends on the durability of the Caracas–Washington agreement and the broader political trajectory in Venezuela. If exports to the U.S. become entrenched, China may permanently reduce its reliance on Venezuelan oil.
Alternatively, should geopolitical conditions shift again, Venezuelan oil could re-emerge as a key component of China’s crude slate. History suggests that energy trade often follows political cycles, making long-term forecasts inherently fragile.
In sum, the expected replacement of Venezuelan oil with Iranian and Russian crude marks an important adjustment rather than a crisis. According to Reuters, Chinese refiners are approaching the situation pragmatically, leveraging floating storage, alternative suppliers, and pricing discipline.
The episode highlights both the vulnerabilities and the flexibility of China’s oil import system. While the loss of Venezuelan oil removes a valuable source of discounted heavy crude, it also reinforces the importance of diversification and strategic foresight. In a world where geopolitics increasingly shapes energy flows, adaptation—not alarm—remains the defining feature of China’s refining sector.